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ABSTRACT. Practical reasoning is a domain of concerns that deal with our most
intimate views on what should be done, every day, in facing the world. Unlike the-
oretical reasoning which forms only beliefs, practical reasoning forms intensions
and sets ground for actions. It deals mostly with the notion of reason, broadly un-
derstood as a term that acquires both rationality and motivation for our actions.
Bernard Williams in “Internal and external reasons” (1981) introduced a strong
and influential distinction, the distinction between internal and external reasons.
Williams explicitly argues in favour of internalism, excluding the existence of ex-
ternal reasons and placing the burden of proof on the externalists. In this paper
I will reconsider his views drawing on John Skorupski’s insights on Williams in
“Internal Reasons and the Scope of Blame” (2007) and Skorupski’s cognitive in-
ternalism. I will criticise both of their internalistic accounts and argue for an
Aristotelian framing of their main arguments which I believe is a fairer deal in
their contribution to the practical reasoning issues.
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1 Broad picture: motivating and normative reasons
The main concern of this paper is the relation between reasons and beliefs. Beliefs are inten-
tional states, which means that they are about something in the world and therefore can be
true or false, succeeding or failing to fit to it. Reasons, on the other hand, are a more complex
notion. Three poles are usually introduced in the debate: Humean, Aristotelian and Kantian
(Cullity and Gaut, 1997).
Humeans emphasize non-cognitive states such as wishes and desires as ones that lead our
actions, drawing on Hume’s “Reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions, and
can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them” (Hume, 1888, pp. 415–
416). Bernard Williams’ internalism is most commonly understood as such Humean account.
Aristotelian pole is the virtue ethics’ one – people have more or less virtues, but there is a set
of characteristics one should aim to in order to live a full and happy life – a good life. The
virtue consists in acquiring knowledge about the constituents of good life and ways of living
it. Aristotle’s theory of virtue integrates the rational with the emotional and emphasizes the
exercise of rational faculties. The Aristotelian conception of moral virtue is part of the greater
project of giving an account of the good life. Living according to virtue is the most important
element of living such life.
A good man is a man who is well functioning, and the unique human function is
reason – the ability to think rationally and acquire wisdom and knowledge. This
is what distinguishes man from beast. [. . . ] Virtue and practical wisdom go hand
in hand, though they are not identical. (Driver, 2001, p. 2)
John McDowell is one of the most influential moral philosophers that defend Aristotelian
position on reasons. In his words:
Occasion by occasion, one knows what to do, if one knows, not by applying univer-
sal principles but by being a certain kind of person: one who sees situations in a
certain distinctive way. (McDowell, 1998b, p. 73)
The third, Kantian pole, places moral reasons in the centre of our actions. They guide us
because responsiveness to them is a part of our cognition and ignoring them counts as failure
of rationality. We are intrinsically moral beings and therefore inclined to always consider
moral reasons in our constant struggle with passions. Kantian ethics is therefore called
ethics of duty. It is also a cognitivist approach, because we form beliefs about what is morally
right and wrong. Christine Korsgaard is one of the leading Kantian moral philosophers and
this is how she explains the role of reflexivity and reasons:
[Reflexivity] sets us a problem no other animal has. It is the problem of the nor-
mative. For our capacity to turn our attention on to our own mental activities is
also a capacity to distance ourselves from them, and to call them into question. I
perceive, and I find myself with a powerful impulse to believe. [. . . ] Shall I act? Is
this desire really a reason to act? The reflective mind cannot settle for perception
and desire, not just as such. It needs a reason. Otherwise, at least as long as it
reflects, it cannot commit itself or go forward. (Korsgaard, 1996, p. 93)
Problems arise because we sometimes aren’t motivated in a certain, say intelligible way,
and on the other hand, some intelligible choices don’t seem to be motivating at all. What
reason do we have to act moral if we didn’t sleep well, if we don’t care enough, if there are
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difficult choices to make? And how are we to explain motivation for a number of actions of
no significance at all, like staring out the window, like deciding to get out and then deciding
to turn back in, like lighting a cigarette, eating when not hungry and things like that. Even
acting morally in a selective way – why give money to the violin player on the street or join a
humanitarian campaign, and a few minutes after yell on benevolent close persons to shut up,
or failing to stand up for something you care, yet simply not enough to be motivated? How
come that some of our actions do well in our aims to acquire reasons for them whatsoever, and
other seem simply to get done, having very few chances to get even a correct explanation, not
to mention justification? How is then possible to offer a sound account of practical reasoning?2
Justification is a far more difficult notion than explanation. A smoker who has decided
to quit smoking can still explain lighting a cigarette, in terms of strong desire, psychological
state etc, but it will be harder to justify that action, if reasons for quitting are strong. Justified
action is the right, desirable action to do. This issue is closely related to the distinction
between motivating and normative reasons. Motivating reasons are the ones that motivate,
that in fact are a trigger for an action, while normative reasons count as ones that must be
taken in consideration while deciding what to do, no matter what, in the end, is actually
done. Normative reasons carry normative requirement. They can be reasons of rationality,
prudence, morality or any other category that for someone contains normative requirement
(Smith, 1994, pp. 94–98). For example, I ought to open my umbrella because it’s raining. I
ought to call a friend I haven’t heard from a while because I want to know how he’s doing.
I ought to prepare a birthday present because it’s usual when you’re invited to a birthday
party. I ought to write this passage because it clarifies the topic. Each of these claims offers
a justification of an action.
This opens further questions for the relation between reasons and motivation. When are
people actually motivated to act out of reasons they believe they have? Can a reason for a
specific action or a lack of action be completely unknown and unavailable to the agent, and
therefore remote from his actual motivation? For example, the fact that an earthquake is
going to happen is a good reason for evacuation but since no one knows that it’s about to
happen, there is no connection between normative reason, the forthcoming earthquake, and
the motivation for leaving the place. Are we still right in calling the earthquake a reason?
The inhabitants certainly also have normative reasons to stay in their homes – their life is
there and they don’t think about disasters. But the earthquake will happen even though they
don’t know it and since staying alive seems also to carry a normative requirement, we might
think there is a stronger reason for them to leave. This leads us to internal and external
reasons and internalism and externalism.
2 Internalism and externalism: Williams’ account
Internalism is closely related to Humean approaches because it requires that reasons mo-
tivate the agent and therefore emphasizes the subjectivity of motivating reasons, allowing
them to be agent-relative. If I’m introspectively aware of what I want then I can’t be wrong
because having a desire, I also have a motive, and having a motive acquires me also with
2In her “Scepticism about Practical Reason” (1986) Christine Korsgaard distinguishes between content scepticism
and motivational scepticism. Content scepticism doubts about the bearing of rational considerations on the activities
of deliberation and choice, while motivational scepticism doubts about the scope of reason as a motive. She claims
that motivational scepticism is always based on content scepticism, and that it has no independent force. That is
against the view that motivational considerations alone provide grounds for scepticism about practical reasoning.
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having a reason. Externalists, on the other hand, think that a reason for an action can exist
no matter what agent’s wishes or desires are or whether the reason is available.
Moral reasons are common examples of external reasons. Why should we act out of duty,
fulfil our obligations and take care of other people’s feelings, when in certain situations that
simply means nothing to us? What kind of reason is it, who prescribes it and why should it
count as a reason for me? Externalist would claim that such kind of reason, psychologically
remote from motivation, exists – whether as information I don’t have (as with the earthquake
example), whether as a moral reason (why would I help my brother with his homework when
he can do it himself and I’m really not in the mood?), or as a prudential reason (if, for example,
I refuse to take the medicine that would help me: do I have a reason to take it?).
In “Internal and external reasons” (1981) Bernard Williams claims that only internal rea-
sons exist. He introduces “subjective motivational set” (S) (p. 102), from which the agent
acquires reasons for actions and those reasons are agent-relative. It is necessary that, in
doing that, he has no false beliefs and has all the relevant ones. Motives for me are not
motives for someone else and what constitutes one’s subjective motivational set has to do
with his own perspective, personal history and preferences. He states four propositions about
internal reasons:
(i) An internal reason statement is falsified by the absence of some appropriate element
from S.
(ii) A member of S, D, will not give A a reason for φ-ing if either the existence of D is
dependent on false belief, or A’s belief in the relevance of φ-ing to the satisfaction of D
is false.
(iii) (a) A may falsely believe an internal reason statement about himself.
(b) A may not know some true internal reason statement about himself.
(iv) Internal reason statements can be discovered in deliberative reasoning.
(Williams, 1981, pp. 102–104)
Williams cares to treat his agent as a person who deliberates rationally and to whom we won’t
be inclined to impute justifications he didn’t deserve, whether because he would deal with
false beliefs, whether because he would act in a capricious or unreasonable ways, satisfying
bizarre and non-standard wishes3.
But notice the important part – the relation between motive and reason. Not every reason
is a motive and some motives are completely unreasonable. Where do we place normative
reasons then? Why do we do anything? Why should we ought something? Is the solution
to abandon the concept of reason and keep only the motive, if it’s the only one to give an
inclination to act? But where have we acquired the motive? It is getting complicated. Can
it be that the motive is a part of S – for no reason? If motive has to do with desires, desires
with values, values with reasoning and reasoning with rationality, then it has to be that nor-
mative reasons have their place in practical reasoning. The thing is exactly in the normative
requirements – though their content depends on agent’s individual psychology, as a form they
3The gin-tonic case (Williams, 1981, p. 102). Agent doesn’t know that the glass contains petrol instead of gin. He
wants to drink gin-tonic, meaning he wants to mix the content of the glass with tonic. He obviously has an internal
reason to do that: he believes that it’s the means for satisfying his end, drinking gin-tonic. But he also has an
external reason not to do it – there’s information he doesn’t have, the one that would provide him with a reason not
to take the action. False belief is the one about the content of the glass and a bizarre wish would be to claim that he
has a motive to drink petrol, because he doesn’t.
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universally give justification for actions, they exist and are relevant. In short, normativity is
a form, not the content.
What about deliberative reasoning?
A clear example of practical reasoning is that leading to the conclusion that one
has reason to φ because φ-ing would be the most convenient, economical, pleasant
etc. way of satisfying same element in S, if not necessary in a clear and determi-
nate way. [. . . ]
As a result of such processes an agent can come to see that he has reason to do
something which he did not see he had reason to do at all. In this way, the deliber-
ative process can add new actions for which there are internal reasons, just as it
can also add new internal reasons for given actions. [. . . ]
We should not, then, think of S as statically given. The processes of deliberation
can have all sorts of effect on S, and this is a fact which a theory of internal reasons
should be very happy to accommodate. So also it should be more liberal than
some theorists have been about the possible elements in S. I have discussed S
primarily in terms of desires, and this term can be used, formally, for all elements
in S. But this terminology may make one forget that S can contain such things as
dispositions of evaluation, patterns of emotional reaction, personal loyalties, and
various projects, as they may be abstractly called, embodying commitments of the
agent. Above all, there is of course no supposition that the desires or projects of an
agent have to be egoistic; he will, one hopes, have non-egoistic projects of various
kinds, and these equally can provide internal reasons for action. (Williams, 1981,
pp. 104–105)
What is Williams saying? It’s not that Humean insisting on passions that guide reason makes
the agent an irrational creature led by dubious forces. Rather, the agent deliberates and
forms beliefs. Though beliefs are not desires, they still can motivate.
The problem for Williams is that this can as well be understood as a quite Kantian ac-
count. We might say: of course, values and norms are biased in our reasoning and behaving,
and desires themselves are derived from them. That is why the role of desires is not as sig-
nificant as it may seem, because what counts more is a stronger claim of normativity in the
heart of the issue, otherwise there would be no insisting on deliberative reasoning and, what
is especially indicative, hoping that the agent won’t be egoistic. One might want to read this
as a Kantian picture dressed up in a likable sub-Humean subjective motivational set. More-
over, I argue for an Aristotelian reading – what Williams wants is virtue. According to Julie
Driver (2001, p. 1), Aristotle’s theory of virtue is attractive because Aristotle focused on the
issue of what it was to be a good person, and many recent ethicists found this a welcome relief
from theories that focus on the evaluation of action4.
The virtuous agent recognizes what is good, “sees things as they are,” and acts
accordingly. (Driver, 2001, p. 1)
My next concern is the status of moral reasons and their role in internalism-externalism de-
bate. Williams briefly comes across the relation between “there is a reason for A to. . . ” and
4Driver (2001, p. 1) writes that the Aristotelian view has become very influential: Alasdair MacIntyre views the
Aristotelian tradition as the one that will save ethics from aimless fragmentation, Rosalind Hursthouse presents a
neo-Aristotelian account of virtue ethics and John McDowell appropriates the Aristotelian idea that virtue involves
correct perception of morally relevant facts.
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“A ought to. . . ”. He says that Kant’s categorical imperative should be re-examined, better to
say, the status of the claim that one ought to do something no matter of one’s own desires.
He reminds that what usually counts as external reasons don’t just seem to be moral rea-
sons, which we already saw with the gin-tonic case, and then he concludes that claims about
reasons are sometimes understood as equivalent with claims about what ought to be done,
meaning that they are defined as being normative. He doesn’t go further though and with-
draws from the discussion about the claims which contain the expression ought to, turning
back to the nature of external reasons. They appear to be able to be true regardless of the
agent’s motivation:
But nothing can explain an agent’s (intentional) actions except something that mo-
tivates him so to act. So something else is needed besides the truth of the external
reason statement to explain action, some psychological link; and that psychologi-
cal link would seem to be belief. A’s believing an external reason statement about
himself may help to explain his action. (Williams, 1981, p. 107)
So, a supposed external reason becomes internal in the moment A finds it as a new belief
in his S and therefore making it a possible source of motivation. That’s why, according to
Williams, there can never be external reasons, because a reason for action is either internal
reason or no reason at all5.
Next thing he does is placing the burden of proof on the externalists. He wants them to
show how a belief about a reason is connected to motivation. They can’t do that with the
manoeuvre with the new element in S that an agent would acquire by deliberative reasoning
because, according to Williams, an externalist wants the external reason itself to be a reason
for exhibiting an action, regardless of the deliberative thinking and pre-existing motivation.
It wouldn’t be acquiring new motivation, but an independent existence of reason in a fact
that has nothing to do with the psychology of the agent. Williams finds it unacceptable, em-
phasizing both the plausibility of Humean position and of the claim that all external reason
statements are false. There’s only a distanced “reason” that would like to implicate acting
without rational connection to the agent. What follows is especially interesting.
It is the external reasons theorist who faces a problem at this point. There are
of course many things that a speaker may say to one who is not disposed to φ
when the speaker thinks that he should be, as that he is inconsiderate, or cruel,
or selfish, or imprudent; or that things, and that he would be a lot nicer if he were
so motivated. Any of these can be sensible things to say. But one who makes a
great deal out of putting the criticism in the form of an external reason statement
seems concerned to say that what is particularly wrong with the agent is that he
is irrational. It is this theorist who particularly needs to make this charge precise:
in particular, because he wants any rational agent, as such, to acknowledge the
requirement to do the thing in question. (Williams, 1981, p. 110)
Williams charges externalists with the assumption that they would be inclined to accuse the
agent of irrationality if she doesn’t take external reasons in consideration. In the background
5John McDowell’s paper “Might There Be External Reasons?” (1995) presents a significant contribution to the
debate over the existence of external reasons and explicitly argues against Williams’ account. McDowell holds that
Williams wrongly thinks externalism is a form of “moralism” that aims to convict immoral people of some form
of irrationality in their deliberation (I agree with McDowell), and questions Williams’ assumption that the agent’s
coming to be motivated must be a result of rational deliberation, instead of being the result of a non-rational process
like conversion.
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is the question about normative reasons and what one ought to do. But what is at issue is
that Williams himself has argued for his theory of internal reasons in the previous passage
with the argument that the lack of existing motivation out of which a new one could arise
by deliberative thinking is nothing but the lack of rational connection between a reason and
the agent’s psychology. That means that he also accuses of irrationality. In this case, irra-
tionality out of arising of new motive where there hadn’t been one before, and there was no
deliberative thinking either. For a reason should have been internal or there was no reason
at all. However, it’s all about rationality no matter what side we’re on.
What fails to convince me in Williams’ argument is that he introduces the gin-tonic case
as a paradigmatic example of what might want to count as an external reason, but continues
to argue against his opponents presuming they have something to say about moral reasons,
of which Williams himself doesn’t say much. He rather offers a theory that abolishes nor-
mativity as a significant property of a reason, except if it is being understood as equivalent
with motivation. At the same time he hopes that the agent won’t be egoistic (because it’s
not convenient?) and that he will acquire new motivations out of subjective motivational set
through the process of deliberative reasoning. I conclude that Williams hopes, as well as his
supposed opponents, that the agent won’t be irrational.
3 Cognitive internalism
John Skorupski offers a discussion of Williams’ concept of internal reasons, providing them a
Kantian framing – cognitive internalism (2007). His aim is to distance internal reasons from
the Humean picture in whose light they are most commonly presented and understood, and
give special place to autonomy, spontaneity, auto-reflection and self-governance in accounts
of moral reasons and grading individual capacity for responding to them.
According to Kant, every rational agent acts autonomously, he is his own legislator and he
can’t be wrong about it because moral law imposes on him as a truth of reason. Moral reasons
are universal because they are expected to be a part of cognitive package of every rational
deliberator and agent. Moral reasons have motivating force because reason itself establishes
them as a principle of functioning. Kantians have the task to see how this is possible – in
what way can one acquire appropriate motivation for acting out of demands of morality, and
what makes them binding?
Another important element of Kant’s moral philosophy is spontaneity. It emphasizes the
self-regularity of process of comprehending that the moral reason is a reason for me, intro-
spectively, without external help and suggestion. It is important to notice the following –
when I am justified in believing that such reason is present, I am obliged to act out of it. But
what justifies us in recognizing something as being a reason? Precisely our rationality that
imposes demands of morality as the ones that count for deliberating beings like us. The most
important feature is the cognitive ability to establish something as a reason and thus being
justified in believing that it is a reason for oneself, and not the independent existence of that
reason. In that way reasons are being established and not merely recognized.
In another paper (1999) Skorupski emphasizes exactly this difference between spontane-
ity and receptivity. With receptivity, it would be a matter of recognizing, because receptivity
presupposes realistic picture of reasons, where they exist independently of our mind and
cognitive capacities. That is what makes the difference between Kantians and intuitionists.
Intuitions grasp moral reasons that exist realistically in the external world, outside of the
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cognitive make-up. On the other hand, moral reasons for Kant are the truths of reason, true
precisely on the grounds of being brought by reason and not being recognized somewhere
“outside”6. If everyone had the disposition to be an ideal deliberator, everyone would be able
to establish them, but there is no such convergence, we are not ideal deliberators and that is
the main problem for Kantian positions. What motivates, or doesn’t motivate us in acting out
of demands of morality?
Skorupski underlines the prospects of Williams’ internal requirement as a good starting
point for a general critique of common presuppositions of morality. He reads Williams “leav-
ing out the unsound elements that derive from Hume” (2007). Through four formulations
of the internalism requirement he analyses Williams’ account and formulates Kantian cog-
nitive internalism. He thinks that internalism is a great contribution to a more realistic
understanding of people, their reasons for actions and the practice of blaming. It is not that
moral reasons can’t motivate, but that people differ in the level of ability to adopt them as
reasons for their actions. If, at the same time, we are ready to accept that acting out of
moral reasons is autonomous, characterized by spontaneity, self-legislation and availability
of our reasons to our understanding, position that arises is cognitive internalism. Therefore
he offers four formulations of internalism requirement:
(I) There is reason for A to φ if and only if φ-ing would serve a motive in A-s S.
(II) There is reason for A to φ if and only if A has some desire the satisfaction of which will
be served by φ-ing.
(III) X is a reason for A to φ only if A has the ability to recognise that were X to obtain, that
would be a reason for A to φ.
(IV) If A has a moral obligation to φ then A has reason to φ.
(Skorupski, 2007, pp. 77–102)
The first formulation allows that beliefs, not only desires, can be motivating. The second
formulation presents the problem in a narrower Humean way, though it is unclear if Hume
would be likely to argue for any kind of practical reasoning at all – for Hume, beliefs are a
matter of theoretical reasoning, while only desires can motivate to act. Skorupski gives an
example which illustrates the difference between the first and the second formulation (2007,
85–90). If we had the belief that the fact that we’ve stepped on someone’s toe is a reason to
apologize, regardless of the fact that we don’t have a special desire to do so, according to first
model we would have the reason to apologize because believing in what is appropriate can be
a part of our subjective motivational set, while according to second formulation, we wouldn’t
have a reason because we are not acting out of “pure” desire, understood at an emotional,
affective, psychological level.
The third formulation presents significant Skorupski’s turn and this is where his position
is articulated. He says that there has to be a relationship between explanatory and normative
reasons: if it is true that A has a reason to φ, than it has to be possible that he should φ for
that reason. The stress is on the particularization – it is about that specific agent with that
specific reason for that specific action. We recognize that in that case the reason itself carries
the strength that guides to action, while certain ability is demanded on the side of the agent.
It looks like a turn towards external reasons that Williams rejects. But the point is in our
ability to form a belief about the existence of a certain reason. Moreover, this ability justifies
6See Skorupski, 1999, 2007.
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the belief about the existence of that reason, and not the independent existence of the reason
itself – that is why it still maintains an internal reason.
Skorupski (1999) argues for an irrealistic account of reasons, but the ontology of reasons
is not of our main interest here. What remains as a problem is that abilities are distributed
unequally and we are still eager to assure enough of those abilities when it comes to moral
issues. So, Williams hopes that the agent won’t be egoistic, and Skorupski would like agents
to be more “able” in general. This is why I put both of them closer to Aristotle – what they
want is virtue.
For Aristotle, the right sort of knowledge or wisdom is a condition for virtue:
“. . . it is impossible to be good in the full sense of the word without practical wisdom
or to be a man of practical wisdom without moral excellence or virtue. (Aristotle,
Nicomachean Ethics, 1144b27–30)” (Driver, 2001, p. 2)
Knowledge is not identified with virtue, nor is virtue identified with practical wisdom, but
they are closely interrelated. Virtues are dispositions for choice, and in order for the agent
to act from virtue, he must know that what he is doing is the morally correct action. John
McDowell writes that Aristotle supposes that a properly focused application to a situation of
a correct conception of doing well must issue in action (1998a, p. 48).
In full-fledged practical wisdom the correct conception of doing well, with the un-
derstanding that the worthwhileness that it embraces is pre-eminent, is so in-
grained into one’s motivational make-up that when an action is singled out as
doing well, any attractions that alternatives might have are seen as having no
bearing on the question what to do. (McDowell, 1998a, p. 48)
Skorupski’s position of cognitive internalism is formulated in (III), but carefully leading to
(IV). He wonders whether something can be a reason for the agent if he lacks cognitive abil-
ity to recognize it as such, and the importance which the answer to that question has for the
“scope of blame”. He finds Williams’ internalism realistic in its view of people, varieties of
human practices and reasons for their actions but still remains critical about the Humean ac-
count. What he offers is a form of cognitivism – morality is a universal duty but only for those
who recognize moral reasons as reasons of rationality, and also as reasons for themselves, in-
dividual agents, to act out of them, arising motivation. This way internalism is maintained
– on one side, reasons have to be a part of subjective motivational set, and on the other, the
device is not based on wants and desires but beliefs, and not just any beliefs, but on beliefs
about what is morally right and morally wrong, and thus motivating if internally, cognitively
and rationally available.
A special point is being made in examining the “scope of blame”. Skorupski enthusias-
tically tries to re-evaluate common moral presumptions about the nature of morality, moral
acts and ascribing blame to those who fail to respond to them. When are we justified in blam-
ing someone, especially after we’ve accepted to talk about the ability of establishing some-
thing as a reason for action, an ability which is not equally distributed – nor to everyone, nor
at any time? Can one blame someone for not having certain ability or having it developed in
a lesser degree? Can we blame someone for not being able to run faster than he runs? We
are aware of the fact that it is partly a matter of genetics and partly a matter of training and
lifestyle, still, can we blame someone because in a particular time t he scores certain v, not
more or less?
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Imagine someone who doesn’t have a feeling of gratitude7. Does he have a reason to thank
someone for a favour? Are we inclined to say that he has it or that he would have it if only
he could see it? Would we be inclined to say in the same way that cat has a reason not to
chase the mouse, if only it could see it? Skorupski reminds us that we don’t ascribe reasons
to cats and mice. So what can be said in favour of ascribing reasons to agents that don’t
understand them, to whom they can’t get through? We need a Kantian term – universality
of those reasons. Everyone has a reason to be grateful for a favour. Cats and mice are
excluded because they are not agents capable of considering and evaluating circumstances
or comprehending gratitude and similar feelings as something reason-giving. People, on the
other hand, are such creatures. Failures of that sort are being sanctioned and one deliberates
whether something could have been done otherwise.
According to Skorupski, if someone is really incapable of understanding and feeling grat-
itude, then he doesn’t have a reason to be grateful, considering the third formulation of the
internalistic requirement. But precisely because the reason of gratitude is a universal rea-
son, we won’t say that it is not a reason at all. Just that it is not a reason for that certain
agent because of the contingent facts of his psychology. In short, reasons are universal, but
there are all sorts of people, and modern morality doesn’t handle that well enough. So, being
without a clue of a way out of the puzzle, two things are usually done: one arbitrary concept
of morality is being prescribed, one that is also a product of a contingent psychology8, or the
notion of universality of reasons is being abandoned. Refusing to do either of that is precisely
the dimension of his cognitive internalism that is to be appreciated the most. At the same
time he refuses to let go the demand of morality, and still wants to take good care of different
human practices. He ends up combining Williams’ internalism and Kantian ethics.
4 Conclusion
Problems arise. Though we can accept a more subtle, refined concept of morality, what does
that really mean? How do we distinguish someone who actually has a feeling of gratitude,
an ability to recognize and respond gratefully in a situation that requires gratefulness, from
someone who doesn’t? If one doesn’t have it, is he to be less blamed if he’s simulating it
very well, making us think he actually has it? Or is it much worse if he is acting really
ungratefully, in the worst sense? Notice the following – we are talking about the feeling of
gratitude. How did we turn to feelings from a cognitivist picture? I believe they are inevitably
connected in a way that doesn’t make it satisfactory to stay within the frames of Humeanism
or Kantianism.
What if the agent does have a feeling of gratitude, but still acts ungratefully, or he some-
times acts ungratefully, or he often, always, or never acts ungratefully? Now we are within
the terminology of psychological research and it might mean we are losing hope to say much
about normativity. And finally, a happy end: what if the agent has a feeling of gratitude
and does act gratefully? Nothing more but that in that particular case Williams’ hopes about
a non-egoistic agent have been met and both Skorupski can recognize his individual with a
high moral capacity.
What I see here is scenery of the third option: the Aristotelian one. It seems to me that
both Williams and Skorupski eagerly introduce forms of internalism, embracing it as a re-
7See Skorupski, 2007, pp. 96–101.
8Skorupski explicitly draws on Nietzsche (Skorupski, 2007, pp. 73, 102–103).
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alistic account, benevolent towards actual human behaviour, though they would most likely
want to be Aristotelians and break free in want for virtuous and intelligent individuals with
high moral capacity. Aristotle’s virtuous person is already motivated to pursue flourishing.
I see no better room for conceiving morality. Humean and Kantian paths seem to get into
trouble.
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